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A quantum key distribution and identification protocol is proposed, which is based on entan-
glement swapping. Through choosing particles by twos from the sequence and performing Bell
measurements, two communicators can detect eavesdropping, identify each other and obtain the
secure key according to the measurement results. Because the two particles measured together are
selected out randomly, we need neither alternative measurements nor rotation of the Bell states.
Furthermore, less Bell measurements are needed in our protocol than in the previous similar ones.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd
I. INTRODUCTION
As a kind of important resource, entanglement [1] is
widely used in the research of quantum information, in-
cluding quantum communication, quantum cryptogra-
phy and quantum computation. Entanglement swapping
[2], abbreviated by ES, is a nice property of entangle-
ment. That is, by appropriate Bell measurements entan-
glement can be swapped between different particles. For
example, consider two pairs of particles in the state of
|Φ+〉,equivalently,|Φ+〉12 = |Φ+〉34 = 1/
√
2(|00〉 + |11〉),
where the subscripts denote different particles. If we
make a Bell measurement on 1 and 3, they will be en-
tangled to one of the Bell states. Simultaneously, 2 and
4 will be also projected onto a corresponding Bell state.
We can find the possible results through the following
process:
|Φ+〉12 ⊗ |Φ+〉34 = 1
2
(|00〉+ |11〉)12 ⊗ (|00〉+ |11〉)34
=
1
2
(|0000〉+ |0101〉+ |1010〉+ |1111〉)1324
=
1
2
(|Φ+Φ+〉+ |Φ−Φ−〉+ |Ψ+Ψ+〉+ |Ψ−Ψ−〉)1324 (1)
It can be seen that there are four possible re-
sults: |Φ+〉13|Φ+〉24, |Φ−〉13|Φ−〉24, |Ψ+〉13|Ψ+〉24 and
|Ψ−〉13|Ψ−〉24. Furthermore, these results appear with
equal probability, that is,1/4. For further discussion
about ES, see [3, 4, 5, 6].
Quantum cryptography is the combination of quan-
tum mechanics and cryptography. It employs fundamen-
tal theory in quantum mechanics to obtain unconditional
security. Quantum key distribution (QKD) is an impor-
tant research direction in quantum cryptography. Ben-
nett and Brassard came up with the first QKD protocol
(BB84 protocol) in 1984 [7]. Afterwards, many protocols
were presented [8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18]. Re-
cently, several QKD schemes based on ES were proposed
[19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25]. In [19, 20, 21] the author intro-
duced a protocol without alternative measurements. It
was simplified [22] and generalized [23] before long, and
its security was proved in [24]. Besides, Zhao et al. pre-
sented a protocol using ES on doubly entangled photon
pairs [25].
In this paper we propose a QKD protocol based on ES,
which needs neither alternative measurements [25] nor
rotation of the Bell states [21, 22, 23]. Simultaneously,
we also use ES to identify the legal users. The security
against the attack discussed in [20] is assured by certain
classical means. See Sec.II for the details of this protocol.
The security is analyzed in Sec.III and a conclusion is
given in Sec.IV.
II. THE QKD AND IDENTIFICATION
PROTOCOL
Suppose the two legal communicators, Alice and Bob,
share a bit string ID, which is used to identify each other.
The initial ID can be obtained by the means discussed in
[26]. The particular process of this scheme is as follows:
1. Prepare the particles. Alice generates a sequence of
EPR pairs in the state |Φ+〉AB = 1/
√
2(|00〉+ |11〉).For
each pair, Alice stores one particle and sends the other
to Bob.
2. Detect eavesdropping.
(1) Having received all the particles from Alice, Bob
randomly selects a set of particles out and makes Bell
measurements on them by twos.
(2) Bob tells Alice the sequence numbers and measure-
ment results of the pairs he measured.
(3) According to the sequence numbers, Alice performs
Bell measurements on the corresponding pairs, and com-
pares her results with Bob’s. For example, consider one of
the pairs Bob measured, in which the sequence numbers
of the two particles are m and n. Then Alice measures
her m-th and n-th particles in Bell basis, and compares
2were not eavesdropped, Alice and Bob should obtain the
same results. Otherwise there must be an eavesdropper
(Eve) in the channel, Alice will abort this communica-
tion.
3. Identify the users.
(1) Bob randomly selects a set of particles out from
his left sequence, and divides them into two subsets av-
eragely, which are denoted as S1 and S2, respectively.
(2) Bob makes Bell measurements on the particles in S1
by twos. Note that for each pair there are two sequence
numbers (because each particle has a sequence number)
and one corresponding measurement result. Here two
notations, P1 and R1 , are introduced to denote all the
sequence numbers and all the corresponding results, re-
spectively. By the same means, Bob measures the parti-
cles in S2 . Similarly, the sequence numbers are denoted
as P2 and the corresponding results as R2 .
(3) Taking the shared information ID as the key, Bob
encrypts P1, R1 and P2 with the one-time-pad cipher:
y = EID(P1, R1, P2) , and sends y to Alice through the
classical channel.
(4) When Alice received the ciphertext y, she decrypts
it with the help of ID: P ′1, R
′
1, P
′
2 = E
−1
ID(y) . According
to P ′1 , Alice measures the corresponding particles in Bell
basis and compares her results with R′1 . If both results
coincide, Alice considers Bob is legal and the communi-
cation continues.
(5) According to P ′2 , Alice measures the corresponding
particles in Bell basis and sends the measurement results
(denoted as R′2 ) to Bob through the classical channel.
(6) Bob compares R2 with R
′
2 . If they are identical,
Bob considers Alice is legal. Otherwise, he stops this
communication.
4. Obtain the key. Bob makes Bell measurements on
his left particles by twos. It should be emphasized that
each pair he measures is selected out randomly. Bob
records the sequence numbers of all the pairs and sends
the record to Alice. Alice then measures her correspond-
ing particles in Bell basis. As discussed in the above
paragraphs, their measurement results would be identi-
cal. Subsequently, Alice and Bob can obtain the key from
these results. For example, |Φ+〉, |Φ−〉, |Ψ+〉 and |Ψ−〉
are encoded into 00, 01, 10 and 11, respectively.
5. Renew ID. Alice and Bob cut a little part from
the key to “refuel” the shared information ID and the
previous one is discarded.
Thus the whole QKD and identification protocol is fin-
ished. By this process, Alice and Bob can not only get
secure key but also identify each other.
III. SECURITY
The above scheme can be regarded as secure. The
reasons are as follows:
1. Each user’s identity is authenticated and it is impos-
sible for Eve to impersonate Alice (or Bob) and distribute
key with Bob (or Alice). In this protocol the shared in-
formation ID is only known to Alice and Bob. If Eve
wants to impersonate Alice, she can not decrypt y cor-
rectly and get P2 in step.3. Consequently Eve can not
present R′2 with which Bob is satisfied. On the contrary,
if Eve wants to impersonate Bob, she will be detected,
too. Because Eve can not give such a “ciphertext” that
Alice would obtain suited P1 and R1 after she used ID
to “decrypt” this “ciphertext”. Furthermore, Eve can
not obtain ID from the qubits and the classical infor-
mation transmitted. Because ID is used as a key of the
one-time-pad cipher to encrypt some random bit strings
including P1, R1 and P2 , Eve can not extract any infor-
mation about ID, even through repeated attempts. In
addition, it makes the protocol more secure that Alice
and Bob would renew ID when they get the key.
2. The key distributed can not be eavesdropped imper-
ceptively. There are two general eavesdropping strategies
for Eve. One is called “intercept and resend”, that is, Eve
intercepts the legal particles and replaces them by her
counterfeit ones. For example, Eve generates the same
EPR pairs and sends one particle from each pair to Bob,
thus she can judge Bob’s measurement results as Alice
does in step.4. But in this case there are no correlations
between Alice’s particles and the counterfeit ones. Al-
ice and Bob will get random measurement results when
they detect eavesdropping in step.2. Suppose both Alice
and Bob use s pairs particles to detect eavesdropping,
the probability with which they obtain the same results
is only (1/4)s . That is, Eve will be detected with high
probability when s is big enough. The second strategy
for Eve is to entangle an ancilla with the two-particle
state that Alice and Bob are using. At some later time
she can measure the ancilla to gain information about the
measurement results of Bob. This kind of attack seems
to be stronger than the first strategy. However, we can
prove that it is invalid to our protocol as follows.
Because each particle transmitted in the channel is in
a maximal mixed state, there are no differences among
all these particles for Eve. Furthermore, Eve does not
know Bob will put which two particles together to make
a Bell measurement. As a result, what she can do is to
make the same operation on each particle transmitted.
Let |ϕ〉ABE denote the state of the two particles and the
ancilla, where the subscripts A, B and E express the
particles belonging to Alice, Bob and Eve, respectively.
Note that we do not limit each ancilla’s dimension, and
allow Eve to build all devices that are allowed by the
laws of quantum mechanics. What we wish to show is
that if this entanglement introduces no errors into the
QKD procedure, then |ϕ〉ABE must be a product of a
two-particle state and the ancilla. This implies that Eve
will gain no information about the key by observing the
ancilla or, conversely, if Eve is to gain information about
the key, she must invariably introduce errors.
Without loss of generality, suppose the Schmidt de-
composition [27] of |ϕ〉ABE is in the form
3|ϕ〉ABE = a1|ψ1〉AB|φ1〉E + a2|ψ2〉AB |φ2〉E
+a3|ψ3〉AB|φ3〉E + a4|ψ4〉AB |φ4〉E (2)
where |ψi〉 and |φj〉 are two sets of orthonomal states, ak
are non-negative real numbers (i, j, k = 1, 2, 3, 4 ).
Because |ψi〉 are two-particle (four-dimensional) states,
they can be written as linear combinations of |00〉, |01〉,
|10〉 and |11〉. Let
|ψ1〉 = b11|00〉+ b12|01〉+ b13|10〉+ b14|11〉
|ψ2〉 = b21|00〉+ b22|01〉+ b23|10〉+ b24|11〉
|ψ3〉 = b31|00〉+ b32|01〉+ b33|10〉+ b34|11〉
|ψ4〉 = b41|00〉+ b42|01〉+ b43|10〉+ b44|11〉 (3)
in which bpq (p, q = 1, 2, 3, 4) are complex numbers. Then
|ϕ〉ABE can be written, thanks to Eqs.(2) and (3), as
|ϕ〉ABE = |00〉AB ⊗ (a1b11|φ1〉+ a2b21|φ2〉+ a3b31|φ3〉+ a4b41|φ4〉)E
+|01〉AB ⊗ (a1b12|φ1〉+ a2b22|φ2〉+ a3b32|φ3〉+ a4b42|φ4〉)E
+|10〉AB ⊗ (a1b13|φ1〉+ a2b23|φ2〉+ a3b33|φ3〉+ a4b43|φ4〉)E
+|11〉AB ⊗ (a1b14|φ1〉+ a2b24|φ2〉+ a3b34|φ3〉+ a4b44|φ4〉)E (4)
For convenience, we define four vectors (not quantum
states) as follows:
vl = (a1b1l, a2b2l, a3b3l, a4b4l) l = 1, 2, 3, 4 (5)
Consider any two sets of particles on which Alice and Bob
will do ES, the state of the system is |ϕ〉ABE ⊗ |ϕ〉ABE .
According to the properties of ES, we can calculate
the probability with which each possible measurement-
results-pair is obtained after Alice and Bob measured
their particles in Bell basis. For example, observe the
event that Alice gets |Φ+〉 and Bob gets |Ψ+〉 , which
corresponds to the following item in the expansion:
1
2
|Φ+〉A|Ψ+〉B ⊗
[
4∑
r,s=1
(arbr1asbs2 + arbr2asbs1 + arbr3asbs4 + arbr4asbs3)|φrφs〉E
]
(6)
Therefore, this event occurs with the probability
P (Φ+AΨ
+
B) =
1
4
4∑
r,s=1
|arbr1asbs2 + arbr2asbs1 + arbr3asbs4 + arbr4asbs3|2 (7)
However, this event should not occur. In fact, if Eve
wants to escape from the detection of Alice and Bob,
any results-pair other than Φ+Φ+, Φ−Φ−, Ψ+Ψ+ and
Ψ−Ψ− should not be appear. Let P (Φ+AΨ
+
B) = 0 , we
then have, from Eqs.(7) and (5),
vT1 v2 + v
T
2 v1 + v
T
3 v4 + v
T
4 v3 = 0 (8)
in which vTl is the transpose of vl.
Similarly, let the probabilities of Φ+AΨ
−
B, Φ
−
AΨ
+
B and
Φ−AΨ
−
B equal to 0, we get
vT1 v2 − vT2 v1 + vT3 v4 − vT4 v3 = 0 (9)
vT1 v2 + v
T
2 v1 − vT3 v4 − vT4 v3 = 0 (10)
vT1 v2 − vT2 v1 − vT3 v4 + vT4 v3 = 0 (11)
4From Eqs.(8)-(11), we can obtain
vT1 v2 = v
T
2 v1 = v
T
3 v4 = v
T
4 v3 = 0 (12)
That is, {
v1 = 0 or v2 = 0
v3 = 0 or v4 = 0
(13)
For the same reason, we can obtain the following results:
(1). Let the probabilities of Ψ+AΦ
+
B , Ψ
+
AΦ
−
B, Ψ
−
AΦ
+
B and
Ψ−AΦ
−
B equal to 0, we can get{
v1 = 0 or v3 = 0
v2 = 0 or v4 = 0
(14)
(2). Let the probabilities of Φ+AΦ
−
B and Φ
−
AΦ
+
B equal to
0, we then have
vT1 v1 − vT2 v2 + vT3 v3 − vT4 v4 = 0 (15)
vT1 v1 + v
T
2 v2 − vT3 v3 − vT4 v4 = 0 (16)
And then {
v1 = ±v4
v2 = ±v3 (17)
(3). Let the probabilities of Ψ+AΨ
−
B and Ψ
−
AΨ
+
B equal to
0, we can get the same conclusion as Eq.(17).
Finally, we can obtain three results from Eqs.(13), (14)
and (17):
1. v1 = v2 = v3 = v4 = 0 ;
2. v1 = v4 = 0 and v2 = ±v3;
3. v2 = v3 = 0 and v1 = ±v4
That is, each of these results makes Eve succeed in escap-
ing the detection of Alice and Bob. Now we can observe
what the state |ϕ〉ABE is by putting these results into
Eq.(4). If the first result holds, we have |ϕ〉ABE = 0,
which is meaningless for our analysis. Consider the con-
dition where the second result holds, |ϕ〉ABE can be writ-
ten as:
|ϕ〉ABE = (|01〉 ± |10〉)AB ⊗ (a1b12|φ1〉+
a2b22|φ2〉+ a3b32|φ3〉+ a4b42|φ4〉)E (18)
It can be seen that |ϕ〉ABE is a product of a two-particle
state and the ancilla. That is, there is no entanglement
between Eve’s ancilla and the legal particles, and Eve can
obtain no information about the key. Similarly, we can
draw the same conclusion when the third result holds.
To sum up, our protocol can resist the entangle-ancilla
eavesdropping strategy.
IV. CONCLUSION
We have presented a QKD and identification protocol
based on ES. The security against the attack discussed in
[20] is assured by a classical means, “randomly select the
particles out and put together by twos”, in stead of the
quantum ones such as alternative measurements [25] or
rotation of the Bell states [21, 22, 23]. Furthermore, this
classical means brings us another advantage. That is, it
is unnecessary to randomize the initial Bell states as in
[19, 21]. This in turn leads to less Bell measurements in
our protocol. For instance, to distribute two bits of key,
Alice and Bob make two Bell measurements in our proto-
col, while in [19, 21] they must make three. Therefore, we
can draw a conclusion that classical means is important
to the research of quantum cryptography and to some
extent it is even more effective than the quantum ones.
Besides, classical means is easier to be implemented. On
the other hand, we have to confess that our protocol has
a disadvantage, i.e., it uses a sequence of entangled states
but not a single quantum system [21, 22, 23] to generate
the key. Fortunately, it is not a fatal problem. Many
QKD protocols work in this model, for example, the fa-
mous E91 protocol [8]. Furthermore, each pair of parti-
cles is still in one of the Bell states and can be reused in
other applications after QKD.
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